The United States Army is at a strategic crossroads wherein dramatic decisions with generational impacts will have to be made. In addition to the uncertainty generated by sequestration, the Army will have to balance a shift in the National Security Strategy all while entering a post-war era with a personnel drawdown to be completed by Fiscal Year 2017. Ultimately, the Army must decide the right size and types of force structure that meet national-level objectives. Alternatives are explored with the intent to provide senior Army leadership with options involving all three components of the Total Force assertive enough to adapt the force within an austere budget environment. There is a tremendous opportunity for change, but it will require the Army to adopt an approach that maximizes the operational reserve capability offered by the Reserve Components while accepting a significantly decreased Active Component.
Total Force Restructuring Under Sequestration and Austere Budget Reductions
The United States Army is at a strategic crossroads wherein dramatic decisions with generational impacts will have to be made in the very near future. Our forces withdrew from Iraq just over a year ago and recent discussions between Presidents Obama and Karzai resulted in an increased pace to the change of the U.S. force mission in Afghanistan to training, advising, and assisting. Concurrently, a significant shift in strategy has been delineated in the 2011 National Security Strategy.
Sequestration remains a looming dilemma resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011 with likely significant ramifications for the Department of Defense budget. As the Department of Defense wrestles with the final determination to our budget, the impact that is ultimately to be decided is the right size and types of force structure that meet national-level strategic objectives. The Army must attempt to balance these competing mission requirements, strategy advances, and budgetary uncertainty all while entering a post-war era with a personnel drawdown to be completed by Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. This paper will present options for restructuring the U.S. Army Active Component and Reserve Forces, including an option for a modification of the Operational Reserve, to meet the evolving security environment and impending budget reductions that have not been experienced since the end of the Cold War. This paper begins with a brief historical background on the patterns of U.S. defense budgets and some of the implications for the Army. Next, a review of the authorities and missions of the Reserve Components and current Army guidance are presented to provide specific insights into how the future Army force structure can be realigned. Lastly, alternatives will be explored with the intent to provide senior Army leadership with options assertive enough to adapt the force within an austere budget environment. The U.S. Army is facing a tremendous opportunity for change in terms of force structure, but this paper will demonstrate that this requires bold initiatives involving all three components of the Total Defense spending is language in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2013 related to the President's notifications and certifications to Congress regarding strategic weapons delivery systems. 6 The implication for the Department of Defense is that it will continue to operate for the near-term in an environment of significant budgetary uncertainty.
Review of Budgetary and Force Structure Guidance
DoD's initial guidance provides some insights to force restructuring that must occur in light of sequestration. Readiness will not come at the expense of a hollow
force, yet the force structure must adapt to provide future capabilities to meet the President's strategic guidance over a wider range of capabilities beyond the counterinsurgency fight of the past decade. Specifically, the force must be able to project power rapidly to engage in one major combat operation while confronting a second aggressor.
Our ground forces will not be sized for long-term stability operations. Army leaders will seek to retain the experience of a more senior force and design a force that capitalizes on that experience to rapidly expand the force if necessary. The resulting effect is to reduce the size of the active Army from a post-9/11 peak of approximately 570,000 to 490,000 soldiers by the end of 2017, along with the removal of eight brigade combat teams. 7 As an acknowledgement to the concept of reversibility provided by the Reserve Component, only modest reductions will be sought across the Army Reserve and National Guard. Similarly, the Army is also trying to operate in this uncertain fiscal environment. 17 A key long-term objective is the expansion of capabilities supporting combatant commanders security cooperation efforts, a task deemed ideal for ARNG soldiers, while also maintaining the same types of force structure as the AC. 18 The implication of the preceding discussion is that the Guard sees itself not only as an Congress. 24 The focus after Vietnam was how to implement the Total Force Concept wherein the reserve and active forces were integrated into a "total force" and reserve forces would augment their active counterparts. 25 Following Desert Shield/Desert Storm and into the War on Terrorism, most reorganization efforts looked at increased efficiencies from command and control restructuring, size reductions and readiness improvements. 26 The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CONGR) completed a more recent and comprehensive review on January 31, 2008. The CONGR recognized that reserve forces are now truly an operational force that must be readily available to support overseas contingencies and homeland emergencies and that they must be fully integrated with the AC, now supported by the Army's Total Force Policy. 27 The DoD recognizes a "focused reliance" on the ARNG and USAR for homeland civil support 10 missions and the dual skill set of the RC, those achieved via military service and civilian careers, complement both overseas contingency and domestic missions. 28 Given that an AC soldier costs more than a RC soldier when not activated, 29 they represent a significant return on investment for the Total Force capabilities and offer a valid option to expanding the AC Given these historical and recent attempts to reorganize the Army's Reserve
Components, there is also evidence of thoughtful consideration on how to avoid past mistakes. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) has stated that one major flaw in previous drawdowns was the inability to create a continuum of service wherein service members can transition from the AC to the RC. The resulting effects were that readiness suffered from a lack of trained service members in critical skill sets and the opportunity to preserve skill sets and experience in the RC, particularly among midcareer non-commissioned officers and senior Company Grade officers, was missed. 30 In a follow-up report, the RFPB explored the cost elements necessary to compute the "fully burdened" cost of AC and RC soldiers in order to provide the most informed answer on balancing the AC/RC mix. Previous analyses have failed to account for some of the cost savings achieved via the RC such as a reduced need for commissary, housing and DoD 37 An applicable assumption from this concept is that the Army will continue to rely on the RC to meet future requirements. 38 This concept provides a description of the future operational environment and the future Army solution to address those challenges under the "prevent, shape, win" construct. 39 It is also noteworthy that the ACC defines a seventh warfighting function for shaping activities conducted with special operations forces, host nations, regional partners and indigenous populations. 40 
Option Development and Alternatives
Taking all of the previous analysis presented to this point, it is obvious that the need for change is clearly understood by DoD and Army leadership. The historical precedence for a budgetary and force structure drawdown is well known and acknowledged, as are the impending budget cuts that may be executed under sequestration. Army strategic guidance offers insights on force structure revision, but does not provide specifics on how to implement significant moves across the Total
Force that might be necessary under austere budget conditions. The alternatives presented below will attempt to address this area of concern. Michéle Flournoy. 43 The understanding is that the ARNG and USAR will continue to be relied upon as part of the operational force along with the accompanying readiness levels associated with that status and not revert back to the strategic reserve mission following the Cold War.
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The impact of sequestration may force a change to this desired utilization despite all of the stated intentions of our leadership. Cost may become such a prohibitive factor that the Army may need to re-look options that provide for more flexibility in maintaining portions of the RC in more of a "strategic reserve" role. In a purely strategic role, the ARNG and USAR should cost less because they would incur a lower training tempo, continue to receive part-time pay and benefits and smaller infrastructure costs such as housing and commissary expenditures. In a study by Strategic Analysis, Inc., three separate cost approaches were utilized to determine the cost of the reserves. What the study revealed is that a traditional method of just looking at the overall portions of the Guard and Reserve budget against the total force structure supports what the Reserve and Guard leadership have stated in their formal guidance documents; that they are a cost effective option. However, that effectiveness is best achieved when used in a strategic reserve role without a high operational tempo. 44 In other words, the more frequently you mobilize an RC unit, the more closely its long-term fully-burdened cost approaches that of a similar AC unit. The study also evaluated the cost of the individual reservists and found that the more duty days an individual reservist served, the lower his cost per day because costs are spread out over more days. 45 When unit costs are considered, particularly when they are part of rotational force that requires a pipeline of reserve units in the queue to be trained and then deployed, the same cost effectiveness is not achieved. The cost of reserves is tied to the level of readiness and rotational policies, so it is possible to lower their cost by deploying them quicker, i.e. maintaining higher readiness levels, and thereby utilizing them longer in a deployed status. 46 That must be balanced against funding that higher level of readiness, which will almost certainly be in danger under sequestration as well as the potential to erode retention rates and the support of employers and families.
Possible options for implementing a shift to a utilization model more akin to a strategic reserve can be attained by adding flexibility to the current categories of Reserve status. RC soldiers might benefit from distinct categories where they are in an operational reserve status with all of the associated additional training readiness and deployment implications and then transition to a pure strategic reserve status with lower readiness, expectation of mobilization and compensation. 47 Another option is to create suggests that this might be a viable option given the requisite infrastructure and capability to maintain cadre proficiency. 48 A benefit of a strategic reserve aside from the cost perspective is that it offers predictability for service in the RC. This is consistent with one of the underlying tenets of the ARFORGEN model and allows for commanders and families to plan for important events. 49 A strategic reserve model also provides benefits along a more traditional approach. It provides for a dependable ready force that allows the nation flexibility to deal with unforeseen problems arising from bad assumptions or intelligence. By activating a strategic reserve force we send a strong signal to our level of commitment to our allies and a corresponding message to our adversaries. A true strategic depth is understanding that the Army will not be able to maintain a force that is constantly prepared to deploy across the full-spectrum of operations as a direct result of the looming austere budget conditions. As the AC sheds force structure, it becomes regionally aligned in concert with the Chief of Staff's guidance and can become more expeditionary in nature to meet national strategic interests abroad. Additionally, the RC may prove to be the best keeper of the emerging cybersecurity force structure, as the Army may want to seek a new generation of computer network specialists recruited from academia and civilian information technology jobs that can maintain relevancy via their civilian jobs. Taken together, the RC would then be employed both as whole units that can be trained and employed as part of a regularly scheduled ARFORGEN cycle, or as specialized enablers that support an AC BCT in a particular mission requirement.
The idea of a decreased AC force structure is not as outlandish as it might appear at first blush. Notable defense industry analysts advocate for conceptually dramatic reductions in the AC force structure as a means to achieve savings beyond the rhetoric that has focused on achieving efficiencies. One approach is to make significant changes above and beyond the currently scheduled cuts to the defense budget in the out years, which have the potential for being offset by higher than expected costs in other sections of the budget. An example of this type of cut is to reduce the Army beyond the stated objective of 490,000 personnel to approximately a 1990-level of 450,000. A second approach is a more severe reorientation of America's global role, reducing the Army to a force level below 400,000. This approach assumes risk in a traditional two-war strategy, but would seek to retain the Army's prestige as a preeminent global land power and more importantly facilitate global foreign engagement during times of peace. 52 The role of the AC should also change to reflect a new threat environment. Two of our greatest potential adversaries, Russia and China, have shown a propensity and expressed a strategic shift towards utilizing irregular and asymmetric tactics in conjunction with conventional forces should a conflict break out. 53 Another notable 20 defense analyst advocates for a strategy of assured access. Given the limited resources the DoD will have at its disposal, our objectives must also reflect a more limited vision.
"The current and future challenge to stability in the western Pacific and the Persian Gulf is not a cross-border invasion but the spread of A2/AD capabilities, which will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to operate freely in those areas." 54 Our force
should not be optimized for regime change via invasions, but rather achieve forward defense by deterring regional aggressors and protecting the global commons. This strategy allows us to leverage several U.S. advantages including our nuclear options, the strength of our network of alliances and partnerships and our lead among military technological systems. 55 Similarly, our comparative advantage in stability and counterterrorist operations lies in the quality of our personnel, not quantity. Therefore, we can seek to avoid interventions and emphasize allies' and partners' ability to confront security threats via our training, advising, assisting and equipping role. 56 The emerging threat and shift in strategy support the notion of a significantly reduced AC.
The idea of shifting emphasis to the RC is likewise supported. One argument being proffered by a European analyst is to "look at increasing reserve forces as a way to boost capacity without breaking the bank." 57 A substantial warning period would likely exist for European nations to call up reserves in a traditional homeland defense scenario and the argument is posited that the bulk of heavy forces could be transferred to the reserves. 58 Another troubling problem confronting the U.S. is the defense spending gap that has become apparent across NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, defense spending among European members has declined 20% despite the fact that their gross domestic product has grown by 55%. This is also reflected in the burden of 21 defense expenditures of European members within NATO, which declined from 33% during the Cold War to 21% in recent years. 59 One option being explored to mitigate these challenges involves the use of pooling and sharing of assets to offset the impact of cuts, although the concept could be more appropriately applied to either similar joint capabilities or those reinforcing or duplicative capabilities between the AC and RC. 60 An assessment of this option reveals that it is the most consistent with senior leader guidance issued to date concerning the use of the RC as an operational force.
The impact of growing the RC would require complete transparency not only in terms of the budget, which may prove infeasible, but all DOTMLPF considerations. Similar to the first alternative, the increased rotational aspect for the RC may prove to be detrimental to recruiting and retention for those RC soldiers who desire fewer deployment opportunities inherent in a strategic reserve role. However, this alternative provides a great amount of flexibility in employing both the AC and RC to meet recurring requirements and to adjust to our future threats and strategy. Using the RC as an enabler force to help tailor regionally aligned AC forces for specific conditions-based missions will prove to be "a more effective and appropriate response to the complex, hybrid challenges of irregular warfare and conventional operations. Special operations forces dedicated to the train, advise and assist mission set could also be part of this growth, leaving the direct action mission sets, e.g. hostage rescue or high value target capture, to the AC special operators. As previously mentioned, cybersecurity forces may be another potential growth option under this alternative. This option also relies on the strategy of "leapfrogging," taking heavy defense cuts today while investing in new future capabilities. This could be appealing to Army leadership by using the RC to maintain current capability sets while seeking to reinvigorate the AC 23 with key technological advances targeting future threats. 63 Agile acquisition initiatives and organizations such as the Rapid Equipping Force already provide the foundations for such dramatic equipping strategies to be realized.
The notion of distinct mission sets or purposed forces has been a topic of recent deliberations. A particular solution is to divide our forces into a "leviathan force" and a "system administration" force, with the former being an event-focused fighting force and the latter a capacity building, preventative force. 64 Another solution set that has been While RC leadership may prefer to execute stability and peacekeeping missions as it best aligns with their inherent skill sets and expertise, it also negates the idea of a 25 reserve force that provides strategic depth. Should the nation find itself in a protracted conflict, we would have no supplementary forces to augment the operational force and we lose the ability to project our commitment levels by mobilizing a reserve force.
Leapfrogging technological advances to the AC while using the RC to maintain current capability sets is likely to take an unsatisfactory amount of time to implement and would confound the growth of the RC mission set and fundamental benefit of seeking distinct mission focuses. The RC would be trying to fulfill two roles until the transition is complete and no component of the Total Force should be subjected to that. Distinct mission sets also imply distinct training, facilities, personnel management systems and other DOTMLPF considerations that come dangerously close to invalidating the Total Force policy.
In some aspects, the "Maximize the Strategic Reserve Option" is very appealing and appears feasible. Loosening the readiness status of select units, and thereby decreasing training and benefit costs, appears to provide a quick solution to address the tighter fiscal constraints the Army will have at its disposal. Returning to a strategic reserve creates a slippery slope wherein additional units could be placed in this status as an easy fix to address future budget reductions or stave off unit or base closures.
Maintaining leadership experience among the strategic reserve and managing the personnel flows back into the operational force with sufficient proficiency is likely to be problematic along the same lines as previous post-Cold War mobilizations.
Misperception among the American public and even among the components as to what the strategic reserve is and how it would maintain an equal footing with other portions of the Total Force (e.g. being put in the strategic reserve equates to poor performance or being second class) could be a strategic communication challenge as well.
"Maximize the Operational Reserve Model" appears to offer a sufficiently fresh solution that is congruent with and even extends current strategic guidance regarding the Total Force. Recurring themes across all of the alternatives are that the RC will continue to be called upon to execute homeland defense and domestic crisis response missions. Their skills and experience in domestic missions are easily transferable to overseas deployment missions and there will remain a need for the RC to be employed overseas. Given these themes, it is logical to conclude that this option provides the greatest flexibility to the Total Force by incorporating the largest force mix in the RC.
The RC becomes the repository for all necessary capabilities that the AC cannot afford to possess such as enablers, heavy forces and operational support units. This option leverages the inherent strength of the RC-the skills and experience of our citizensoldiers -and allows the Army to preserve the operational experiences of the previous two major conflicts. This option also best allows for the AC to reduce in size as part of our current drawdown, or even further if necessary, yet not lose the competitive advantage to engage the enemy across the spectrum of operations.
Conclusion
Our nation is at a strategic crossroads concerning our security posture. 
